Revolutionary War Historical Article
The American Revolution Month-by-Month December 1780
By Compatriot Andrew "Andy" Stough
Editor's Note: This article was reprinted by Permission of the Gold Country Chapter No. 7 of the CSSAR and was slightly edited by the Sons of Liberty Chapter of the CSSAR
After the debacle of Savannah, Charleston, and Camden, Congress saw that it had erred in controlling the Southern army. Congress had made a bad decision in the appointment of Generals Robert Howe (Savannah), Benjamin Lincoln (Charleston), followed by Horatio Gates who failed miserably at Camden. All had been responsible only to Congress. Even though General George Washington was given the title Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of all armed forces, Congress had reserved for itself all authority in the South. By this action had usurped Washington’s power to fulfill his duty as the overall commander.
Washington, by naming a commander who would be responsible to him instead of Congress, finally had oversight of the entire armed forces, North and South. With this authority he named General Nathanael Greene to succeed Gates. Defrocked by the Quakers because of his choice to militarily serve in the Revolution, Greene had proven his dedication to the American Cause. He gained his military craft and expertise in the field. He had been with Washington since the siege of Boston and had gained the respect and confidence of both Washington and the army through devoted and successful service as a combat commander.
On December 2nd, 1780, Greene succeeded Gates as commander. His style was totally different than Gates. Where Gates was aloof, Greene was close to his officers and considerate of the men. Where Gates assumed that supplies would be furnished, Greene evaluated the possibility of supply as opposed to living off the land. Meeting individually with his officers, he became better informed of the condition and capabilities of his command than any other officer in the Southern Army.
By determining the strengths and weaknesses of his force as opposed to those of British General Charles Earl Cornwallis he arrived at a strategy that he would follow until Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown. Using General Washington’s categorization of the forces available, he planned use of both irregulars and regulars according to their abilities in order to harass Cornwallis and draw him farther and farther from his supply bases, thus diluting his strength and supplies. Greene decided to split his force to coerce Cornwallis to do the same, thereby making the two sides more equal in numbers, if not in capability. He realized that he would be inferior to Cornwallis in the open field, therefore he would fight pitched battles only if he thought he could injure the British far beyond his own casualties, allowing him to leave the field with his own force relatively intact. He had determined that it would be a war of attrition and logistics. At no time would he hold any real estate, further weakening Cornwallis who must stretch his resources to hold territory as well as oppose Greene.
Cornwallis was the author of his own defeat. Given command of the British Southern Army, he was charged with holding the seaboard from the North Carolina border to British Florida, Tories would hold the interior. He was particularly instructed by Clinton to maintain Charleston, the most important city in the South, as his headquarters.
Cornwallis saw things differently. He had always believed that the key to holding the South and thereby winning the war was to hold the state of Virginia. This belief had been a bone of contention between him and British Commander-in-Chief Sir Henry Clinton all along. Aggressive by nature, Cornwallis wanted to take action to make things happen; under Clinton's orders he felt trapped and confined in Charleston. London also saw a need for action and allowed Cornwallis to override Clinton's orders by giving him free rein to attack the problem as he saw fit.
Adding to Cornwallis' discomfort was the failure of well trained, outfitted and supplied Tory units to prevail in the field. Therefor, he must remain in the field to complete the subjugation of the South; British might and experience would prevail, Tories would only be an adjunct to his own forces and commanders.
General Greene, upon assuming command on December 2nd, 1780, set out to obtain capable and battle tested generals to lead his forces. Fortune smiled upon him when on December 3rd, Big Dan Morgan, a Brigadier General from Virginia appeared for duty. He was noted for his ability to get along with frontier people who trusted him to lead them in Battle. Greene counseled with the irregulars Colonels Sumter, Marion and others stating that he had no intention of placing Continental officers over them, but he insisted that they all work as a team. He stated; "You may strike a hundred strokes and reap little benefit from them, unless you have a good army to take advantage of your success."
In mid-December Greene formally divided his small army of 1,600 men into three divisions. To Daniel Morgan he gave the best soldiers that he had, a second division was held under his own command. The third division was given to Brigadier General Isaac Huger. On December 16th Greene directed Morgan to join North Carolina militia under General William Davidson. However, it was the 20th before Greene departed and the 26th before he reached Cheraw Hill and encamped. At this point his army had grown to 650 Continentals, 303 Virginia, and 157 Maryland militia. Cornwallis, who was already in the field, could not believe that Greene would divide his force. With Greene at three different locations Cornwallis felt compelled to split his own force to react against Greene.
This was not as rash as it sounds. Cornwallis knew that some 2,500 fresh troops under a British major general was enroute from Charleston to reinforce his army. Cornwallis, ever eager to reduce the enemy, sent Colonel "Butcher" Tarleton in command of a division to destroy Morgan’s army. By January 1781, Morgan was 140 miles from Greene’s division. There would be a battle, but not one to enhance Tarleton’s reputation.
In September, Benedict Arnold as a general in the British army, had devised and led an attack on New London, Connecticut, where he defeated the Americans in two forts, then butchered the surrendered garrison. Afterwards he entered the town and put it to the torch along with neighboring Groton. Having shown his capability and loyalty to the Crown he was given the task of planning and executing an invasion of Virginia. Clinton, still not sure of Arnold, placed two dependable Colonels, Dundas and Simcoe in the expedition to watch over him. The expedition left Sandy Hook with 1,600 men on December 20th. Due to violent gales the ships were scattered, one warship and three transports with 400 men never rejoined the expedition. Arnold and the remaining ships reached Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the 30th where the troops were transferred to smaller vessels to continue up the James River, debarking on January 3rd, 1781.
References: Arthur Meier Schlesinger’s "Almanac of American History"; Christopher Ward's "The War of the Revolution"; Bruce Lancaster's " The American Revolution"; Robert M. Utley's and Wilcomb E. Washburn's " Indian Wars"; Colin C. Calloway's "The American Revolution in Indian Country"; Dan Higgenbotham's "The War of American Independence".
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