Revolutionary War Historical Article

The American Revolution Month-by-Month April 1780

By Compatriot Andrew "Andy" Stough

Editor's Note: This article was reprinted by Permission of the Gold Country Chapter No. 7 of the CSSAR and was slightly edited by the Sons of Liberty Chapter of the CSSAR

Thus far the year of 1780 had not gone well in the War for American Independence. April would certainly not improve the situation. At the beginning of the month we find American General Benjamin Lincoln and his troops in and around Charleston with defenses of the city firmly established but no match for British General Henry Clinton’s combined sea and land forces. To get a better picture of the siege we need to understand the terrain. Charleston in 1780 much resembled a sore and swollen thumb sticking out in what appears to be a bay. The city is attached to the mainland by a more slender strip of land known as the Neck. To the south of Charleston and the Neck lay St. James Island, Clinton’s base camp. Running west to east along the south side of the neck is the Ashley River with the Cooper River running along the northern side of the Neck. The City and Neck are well fortified but the area east of the Cooper River is secured only by cavalry units. This is Lincoln’s only line of retreat if there is to be one. It was to be a busy month, on April 8th, eight British frigates made a run past Fort Moultrie with little or no damage to either the fort or the attacking fleet. On the 10th, General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot (Royal Navy) jointly demanded the surrender of Charleston and all American troops and equipment. Lincoln countered that he would surrender only if all troops, arms, and supplies were guaranteed safe passage from the city. Clinton declined the terms and the siege was on in earnest.

On April 13th, enemy batteries along the Neck and from James Island began a bombardment on Charleston which not only visited much destruction on the city but also started many fires which potentially could do more harm than the structural damage occasioned by the bombardment.

While General Clinton was the Commander-in-Chief of all British military operations, day-to-day tactics were relegated to General Lord Cornwallis who owed much to his cavalry commander who was Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton; a dedicated and successful butcher who would be the death of many patriots. Tarleton, up to this point in the campaign, was hindered by the loss of all of his horses on the long ocean trip south. Horses that he obtained after landing below Charleston were inferior to what was required for successful cavalry operations. Tarleton had been humiliated by an encounter with Lt. Colonel William Washington’s cavalry command in February and he seethed with revenge. British intelligence had told him the location of Washington’s command. At three a.m. on the April 14th he struck William Washington’s encampment killing or capturing most of the command. More significant was the capture of cavalry mounts, wagons loaded with supplies and the teams to haul them. Tarleton was now supplied with the wherewithal to pursue the rebels. The next day after receiving reinforcements Tarleton moved on to take everything north of the Cooper River thereby closing Lincoln’s last route of retreat. Lincoln was trapped!

British ground forces slowly moved toward the American defenses across the Neck. On the 19th they were within yards of the American lines. At this point Lincoln called his officers together to consider the situation. It was proposed to him that at least the Continentals be gotten out of the city and to a more likely place where they could defend themselves or be used against the British. Lincoln procrastinated, thus setting up the beginning of his ignominious defeat.

Also on the 19th Lincoln called a meeting of both civilian and military leaders in which he proposed to surrender based on the same terms which had previously been refused. The civilian leaders adamantly refused to surrender. On the 20th he again convened a council to consider a surrender and was again refused by the civilian leaders. On the 21st, Lincoln without benefit of the civilian leaders, made an offer to surrender, which was immediately refused.

The siege went on, the Americans made a bayonet charge against the enemy defense lines on the Neck. A few men were captured but there was no significant result of the foray. Meanwhile, British ground forces were slowly closing in on Charleston, capturing outposts on land while the Royal Navy subdued Fort Moultrie.

We must get back to John Paul Jones who after his arrival at Lorient quickly set up the work to be done on Alliance while he was away in Paris. He expected Franklin find money to pay the crew and expenses of repairs for Alliance. He also wished to expedite sale of the prizes captured on the cruise around the British Isles. Arriving at Paris he made official calls then went on to find quarters near Doctor Benjamin Franklin at Passy. Franklin had described Passy as "a neat village on high ground and one half mile from Paris." Jones' stay at Passy not only placed him close to Franklin but also gave him the opportunity to socialize with members of the royal court. He was lionized, particularly by the ladies, and even given an audience with the King. Morison doubts that the audience amounted to much since most audiences with Louis XVI amounted only to the attendee expressing their admiration and greatness of the King who in a bored manner smiled and acknowledged the praise with a nod of the head. By April 20th Jones was ready to return to Lorient but his departure was delayed time and again.

Jones not only was leading the good life while in Paris but receiving progress reports from Lorient and directing the continuing and time consuming repairs and improvements needed on Alliance. As though his social and political duties in Paris were not enough, the American Congress Board of Admiralty notified Franklin to send Alliance home as soon as possible. The Board also required that it transport passengers, among them Arthur Lee and Ralph Izzard of South Carolina. Alliance was also to take on a cargo of arms, munitions and uniforms. All were badly needed by General George Washington. His men were still standing watch without sufficient clothing as well being delinquent in arms and ammunition either to ward off an attack on the winter quarters or for spring operations.

Alliance was a warship, not a cargo vessel. Not only did it not have the room to accommodate the specified cargo but if it were put aboard, Alliance would not have room left over to man the guns if attacked on the way back across the Atlantic. Add to this the impossible furnishing of quarters demanded by the high ranking passengers. In addition to all of the above was the personal baggage, possessions and personal servants acquired by the high ranking passengers during their stay in Europe. Arthur Lee, in addition to his voluminous baggage and servants had acquired a large carriage which he insisted must be transported on Alliance for his use in the states.

You can imagine the furor when this requirement, not to mention the restrictions on the fighting capacity of the ship, was given to Jones who, at best, could be described as short tempered. Morison notes that an American frigate was built with less space than was desired for it to defend itself or to pursue an enemy; a situation that he says existed well into the 19th century. Jones protested being burdened with the passengers and military cargo, stating that much of it would have to be stored on the gun decks, leaving no room for combat. Jones at first flatly refused to transport the passengers and their servants and associated possessions thus giving the always quarrelsome Arthur Lee a large bone to pick upon in his continuing daily attacks on both Jones and Franklin.

There was trouble brewing in Lorient as the crew of Alliance had not been paid since leaving America. They were paid one month's pay on April 22nd , which only whetted their appetite for full payment of crew duty and for payment of funds from sale of the prizes even though none had yet been sold. The question of pay was growing to be a serious morale factor but there were to be more important things for Jones to cope with very soon.

 

References: Christopher Ward’s "The War of the American Revolution"; Samuel Eliot Morison's "John Paul Jones, A Sailor's Biography"; Arthur Meier Schlesinger's "The Almanac of American History"; Carl Van Doren’s" Benjamin Franklin"; Bruce Lancaster’s "The American Revolution" .

 

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